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HANSON’S AUTOMATED MARKET MAKER 
 







From Hanson’s “market scoring rule,” we derive all the necessary formulae to implement a 
corresponding automated market maker for a prediction market.  The market maker has many 
desirable qualities and always stands ready to trade, thus providing liquidity to markets.  The 
formulae cover all transactions for buying and selling market contracts.  In addition, we address 
practical concerns like how to correctly treat rounding errors and how to prevent errors that 
allow traders to cheat the market, and provide a practical numerical example.  We have used 
Hanson's automated market maker to run many markets at Microsoft. 
 
Motivation 
Prediction markets usefully aggregate individual predictions into simple 
prices.  Many studies demonstrate their accuracy in diverse applications, from 
predicting printer sales to predicting outcomes of political elections. 
A prediction market works by creating contingent securities that represent 
the mutually exclusive possible outcomes of a future event.  In its simplest 
form, the contingent security is worth some set amount if the outcome is 
realized, and it is worthless otherwise.  For instance, a security contingent on 
the Green Party winning the next election might be worth $1 if the Greens 
win, but would be worthless if they lose. 
Once the contingent securities have been created, market participants are 
free to trade those securities amongst themselves for some currency.  Security 
prices reflect predictions of the likelihood of the contingent event—high 
prices indicate high estimated probability and low prices indicate low 
probability. 
Two popular mechanisms exist for matching buyers and sellers in 
prediction markets:  continuous double auctions (CDA) and automated market 
makers (AMM).  In a CDA, the market maintains a list of Bids and Asks for 
each security.  The Bids represent individual commitments to buy some 
number of shares of the security at given prices; Asks represent commitments 
to sell shares at a given price.  Anybody wishing to purchase shares would 
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check the lowest Ask price and either accept that price, or post a Bid to buy a 
lower price.  In thinly traded markets, the spread between the lowest Ask and 
the highest Bid can be great—often too great to encourage trading.   The 
complexity of the Bid/Ask process can also discourage traders from entering 
the market. 
Market makers are traders that offer to buy or sell shares at prices with 
small spread.  Market makers can exist with or without a CDA behind the 
scenes.  Humans can set market maker prices, or computer algorithms can 
drive pricing.  In either case, changes in trading behavior will drive market 
maker prices higher or lower. 
An AMM allows traders to place all orders with the AMM, and the AMM 
determines the cost of each transaction and adjusts the prices of the securities.  
AMMs present many advantages to those wishing to implement a prediction 
market.  An AMM can stand ready to trade at all hours, it can react 
instantaneously to changes in trading, and it can eliminate the unfortunate 
spreads found in thinly traded markets.  To be useful, an AMM should have 
the following properties:  the AMM algorithm should not be vulnerable to 
becoming a money pump to a clever trader; the AMM’s potential losses 
should be bounded ahead of time; and the AMM should have tunable 
properties (e.g., how will a $1,000 bet affect prices?). 
Fortunately, Robin Hanson invented the basis for an automated market 
maker that meets all these requirements when he invented “market scoring 
rules” (Robin Hanson, "Combinatorial Information Market Design" [2003] 
Information Systems Frontiers 5:1 at pp107-119.  Available at 
http://hanson.gmu.edu.). 
There are many organizations that offer prediction markets both to the 
broader web community and privately.  Some of the ones offering automated 
market makers of various kinds include: 
 
Consensus Point (http://www.consensuspoint.com/)  
Inkling Incorporated (http://inklingmarkets.com/) 
Hollywood Stock Exchange (http://www.hsx.com/) 
Hubdub (http://www.hubdub.com/) 
Media Predict (http://mediapredict.com/)  
Nosco (http://www.nosco.dk/)  
Popular Science Predictions Exchange (PPX) (http://ppx.popsci.com/)  
ProTrade (http://www.protrade.com/)  
Qmarkets (http://www.qmarkets.net/)  
Shuugi.in (http://shuugi.in/)  
Spigit (http://www.spigit.com/)  
Washington Stock Exchange (http://www.thewsx.com/)  
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Xpree Inc (http://www.xpree.com/)  
Zocalo (http://zocalo.sourceforge.net/) 
 
We go on to describe our internal implementation of Hanson's market scoring 
rule. 
 
II. AUTOMATED MARKET MAKER FRAMEWORK 
 
Hanson’s Market Scoring Rule 
Hanson’s market scoring rule is based fundamentally on “proper scoring 
rules”, which create an incentive-compatible way to reward accurate 
predictions of future events.  Predictions take the form of probability 
estimates, and higher correct estimates are rewarded more generously than 
lower correct estimates.  There are many proper scoring rules, all of which 
have the property that a rational estimator would maximize his expected 
return by revealing his true beliefs.  This requires the score received to 
increase as the estimate of probability of the outcome (ri) increases, such that 
the maximum possible score is received by truthfully revealing the 
probabilities of each outcome. 
Hanson’s market maker derives from the logarithmic scoring rule (Hanson 
2003, p. 109): 
  log  
 
Here,  represents an estimate that event “ ” will occur, and  
represents the score if that event happens.   represents a simple scaling 
factor.  The highest possible score is 0 (when something is predicted with 
certainty 1), and the scores can be arbitrarily lower.  Moreover, the 
logarithmic scoring rule is local, so the score of a given prediction can be 
computed based only on that prediction, independent of the predictions of 
competing events. 
 
An Automated Market Maker 
This scoring rule is easily turned into an automated market maker.  A 
market consists of a set of mutually exclusive outcomes.  Shares of the 
outcome that actually occurs are worth 1, all other shares are worth 0.  The 
market maker sets the price of a given security based on the net amount of all 
securities outstanding.  The more shares of an outcome that are outstanding, 
the higher the price of that outcome.  If we assume that all securities start at 
the same price, and if we let  be the net amount of a given security that has 
been sold, then the price of security  is: 
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  /∑ ⁄  
 
It’s trivial to see that these prices sum to 1, which we would require to 
eliminate arbitrage opportunities.  From this formula, we can derive formulae 
for any transaction that the market maker might want to support:  buying or 
selling securities, determining how much the price will move after a given 
transaction, etc.  The market maker has many desirable qualities: 
 
• The market maker stands ready to buy or sell an unlimited amount 
of any security, although the price of that security may be driven 
vanishingly close to 0 or 1. 
• The market maker only risks losing a bounded amount of money.  
(All market makers risk losing money since they stand ready to 
buy or sell any security and only one of those transactions will 
make money.) 
• The market maker cannot be turned into a money pump through 
clever sequencing of Buy and Sell transactions. 
 
Unfortunately, creating a market maker from the price formula is not as 
simple as it might appear.  That is because the prices change continuously as 
shares are traded—every fraction of a share that changes hands affects the 
price of the next fraction of a share. 
The rest of this paper presents commonly needed formulae for 
implementing the market maker implied by this formula. 
 
III. PRACTICAL FORMULAE FOR HANSON'S AMM 
 
Formulae 
The following symbols will be used for the various formulae: 
 
a.   The stock vector.   represents the market’s holdings of 
security . 
b.   The vector of “reports” (i.e., estimates) of a participant. 
c.   The elasticity constant for the market.  The greater  is, the less 
market prices change with each security purchase. 
d.   The vector of prices of the securities prior to a transaction.   
represents the price of security .  Prices are between 0 and 1, 
exclusive. 
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e.   The vector of resulting prices of the securities after a 
transaction. 
f.   The quantity of a transaction (number of shares). 
g.   The total cost of a transaction (amount of virtual currency). 
 
Setting Initial Prices 
This price formula above differs slightly from Hanson’s by dropping the 
“ ” offsets from the exponents.  The purpose of those offsets is to set the 
initial prices of the securities.  A simpler, equivalent way to set initial prices is 
to have the market patron make an initial “purchase” of securities that will 
drive the prices to the desired levels.  This can be done with: 
 log   
 
where  are the desired initial prices, and  is any arbitrary constant.  It is 
simpler in practice to start with no shares outstanding (si = 0), and all prices 
set equally.  This creates an advantage for early traders, which in practice may 
be a desirable incentive to give traders to participate early.  A third option is 
to allow traders to auction the right to enter the market first, or otherwise 




What is the total cost of a transaction that 
would move the price of a security from  
to ? 
log 11  
What is the total cost of buying  shares of 
a security whose initial price is ? 
log ⁄ 1 1   
How many shares of a security must be 
bought/sold to move the price from  to 
? 
log 11  
How many shares of security can be 
bought/sold for a total cost of ? log  1 1  
What will be the resulting price of a 
security after buying/selling  shares of 
that security with an initial price of ? 
11 1⁄ 1⁄  
What will be the result price of a security 
with an initial price of  after a transaction 
with a total cost of ? 
1 1 ⁄  
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The table above relates how prices, quantities and total cost are related in 
simple transactions.  All signs are from the perspective of the market trader 
(units of currency and shares of stock received by the trader are positive, units 
of currency and shares of stock given out by the trader are negative). 
 
Loss Limit 
Market makers can lose money.  Imagine that the correct security’s 
original price is  and that traders buy as much of that security as they can 
and nothing else.  The market maker would have to pay off each security for 
$1, but would have sold each for less than $1.  The total difference represents 
the market maker’s loss.  The loss limit is: 
 log  
 
In some prediction markets, there is a set amount of money available for 
trading (K).  In this case, the market maker’s loss limit is: 
 
 
  log  1 1  
 




This market maker conveniently supports buying equal amounts of 
competing securities in a given transaction.  To do this, simply use the 
combined prices of the individual securities as  in the preceding formulae.  
Of course, when shares of multiple securities are bought, the stock vector, , 
must be updated for the appropriate constituents.  If we let  be the set of 
securities that are to be bought together in equal amounts, then: 
  ∑ /∑ ⁄  
Conditional Bets 
This market maker conveniently supports conditional bets of the form, “if 
any event in  occurs then I win, if any event in  occurs then I lose, but if 
anything else ( ) happens refund my money.”  Effectively, rather than 
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winning and losing outcomes there are also neutral outcomes.  These bets are 
conditional in the sense that they are of the form “I bet that something in W 
happens given that it was something in  that happens.” 
To create such a conditional bet, it is necessary to have a transaction that 
includes shares of securities in  to pay off a correct prediction, and shares of 
securities in C that will return the cost of the whole bet in case something 
outside of  happens.  To buy  shares of this conditional bet, you must 
buy  shares of  and just enough  shares to refund the total cost, .  In 
other words, there must be exactly  shares of , so that if  ends up 
including the correct outcome, the trader receives just enough of a benefit to 
offset his initial cost . 
Fortunately, it is easy to determine the price for this conditional bundle of 
shares.  Use the standard formulae above with the following price: 
 
|  ∑ /∑ ⁄  
 
How to Set ? 
The elasticity constant  controls how much prices change for a given 
transaction size (measured in shares or cost).  Setting  is a vexing problem: 
set too low, the market prices will swing wildly on any trade, and set too high, 
the market may not move enough reasonably reflect aggregate opinions. 
The simplest rule of thumb is to determine how large a bet should move 
the market to a given price.  For instance, if $1,000 is bet on some security 
and nothing is bet on any other, it may be desirable for the price of that 
security to move to $0.99.  (I.e., a $1,000 bet would only be made if the bettor 
had 99% confidence in the underlying event.)  This leads to: 
  log 11  
 
Note that the original price, , for this computation is typically the 
starting price for all N securities, which is 1/ . 
 
Adjusting  When the Market is Open  
For some markets, it is impossible to know how much money will be 
wagered, which makes it difficult to pick an appropriate amount of elasticity 
that works throughout.  In this case, it is helpful to be able to pick a small  
(high elasticity) and then adjust as more money is brought into the market. 
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Adjusting  presents two challenges.  First, changing  without changing 
anything else will change all of the prices.  (Recall that prices are a function 
of the stock vector and .)  Second, the elasticity affects market maker risk—
increasing  will increase the loss limit for the market maker. 
To change  without affecting market prices, the market maker must 
purchase enough of each security to maintain the pre-change prices.  This can 
be accomplished using the same formula used to set initial prices: 
 log   
 
With this formula, simply set  to minimize the number of shares that the 
market maker must buy, and then buy the shares needed. 
The new risk of market maker losses is determined by the loss limit at the 




IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS BEYOND MATH 
 
While the formulae that drive the market maker are essential to any 
implementation, there are other practical concerns. 
 
Stock Vectors 
Any market maker implementation must keep an accounting of the state 
of the market.  This accounting is simple: 
 
• The market maker must keep track of its net position in each 
security.  I.e., how many shares of each security are outstanding. 
• The market maker must know the elasticity constant, . 
 
Strictly, speaking the market maker could keep track of prices rather than 
shares, but that can often present problems with rounding numbers, since in 
practice it is easy to constrain the number of shares to an exact value, but 
harder to constrain the price changes. 
 
Prices 
In our experience, many people do not feel comfortable with prices 
ranging from 0 to 1, and are much more comfortable with 0 to 100.  To 
accommodate prices in a range 0,  it is necessary to replace amounts of 
currency with their scaled equivalents, i.e. P with P/ , and K with K/  in all 
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of the preceding formulae.  See the practical numerical framework section 
below for the modified formulas. 
 
Short Sales 
In our experience, many people wish to enter into short sales—selling 
shares they don’t own, but presumably believe are overpriced.  The market 
maker supports short sales. 
Although technically supported, there is one practical reason why some 
markets disallow short sales.  Short sales create a liability on the part of the 
seller to cover that sale some day.  This adds complexity to the overall trading 
platform, and creates the need for more policies to govern the degree to which 
short sales must be “covered.” 
To avoid short sale issues, we encourage presenting traders with the 




If not handled properly, the rounding of floating point numbers on a 
computer can create possible ways to pump money out of the market maker 
by creating a sequence of trades that round in the trader’s favor. 
Avoiding these errors is straightforward.  First, the market must define the 
precision at which shares are traded.  For instance, whole shares, shares to two 
decimal places, etc., can be supported.  Similarly, the market must define the 
precision at which money is traded.  The internal precision at which shares 
and money are traded may be greater than that displayed to the trader, in 
which case the trader sees a truncated or rounded representation of the actual 
value.  (There is a risk of trader confusion when actual and displayed 
precision differ, however.) 
Once the precision has been decided, the following rules must be obeyed: 
 
• Use share quantities as the fundamental units for any transaction. 
o For purchases from the market maker, round quantities 
down to the precision. 
o For sales to the market maker, round quantities up to the 
precision. 
• Once share quantities have been computed, compute total costs. 
o For purchases from the market maker, round costs up to 
the precision. 
o For sales to the market maker, round costs down to the 
precision. 
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Share prices need not be rounded up/down if the market maker charges a 
“transaction fee” that exceeds the precision of money in the system. 
 
Turning Currency Into Something of Value 
Sometimes prediction markets employ virtual currency in lieu of real 
currency, which may subsequently be turned into something of value.  
Whatever scheme is employed, it is important to preserve incentive 
compatibility, i.e. a trader's incentive should always be to tell the truth to 
maximize his reward.  One hazard is the inadvertent creation of tournament 
incentives, where a trader is rewarded for making risky predictions that do not 
necessarily represent his true beliefs.  Rewarding the top N traders in a market 
creates tournament incentives that are not incentive compatible.  Since the 
primary goal of prediction markets is to make accurate predictions, we 
strongly advise caution in this area. 
An incentive compatible alternative is to convert market currency into 
raffle tickets, and then award prizes by lottery.  However, in our experience 
this can be quite frustrating to traders when prizes are won by traders with 
small balances.  We sometimes compromise by offering two prizes per 
market: a large prize awarded by lottery, and a smaller prize that goes to the 
"top trader" in the market.  A small tournament incentive is present, but the 
larger lottery prize discourages risky behavior and preserves overall incentive 
compatibility.  Similarly, simply publishing rankings creates tournament 
incentives among competitive traders. 
 
Setting and Adjusting Market Maker Elasticity 
Determining a desirable elasticity for the market maker is difficult.  If a 
market is too elastic, traders will observe wild price fluctuations.  If a market 
is not elastic enough, traders are frustrated by the relatively static prices. 
As discussed above, our approach has been to make an estimate of the 
participation we expect for a market, then to set the market maker elasticity so 
that if all active traders predict the same outcome with all of their currency, 
the price for that security is driven to a fixed value.  Unfortunately, estimating 
the participation is difficult for new markets. 
We are currently deploying markets that adjust their elasticity as trader 
capital enters the market.  We limit the size and frequency of the changes to 
avoid creating the perception among traders that the market is changing 
radically.  When the elasticity changes, the market maker adjusts the stock 
vector to keep prices from changing. 
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Encouraging Participation 
We often observe large spikes in trading activity right after a market is 
created or a reminder sent, followed by low trading activity until the next 
reminder.  To increase participation (without creating perverse incentives) we 




V. PRACTICAL NUMERICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
When implementing an automated market maker, we need to take 
everything discussed above into account, including the inaccuracies of 
floating point representations and computations.  We add in the scaling factor 
c, which represents the maximum price for a security, most commonly 1 or 
100 (both have been used at Microsoft).  Adjusting the math for this results in: 
 
What is the total cost of a transaction that 
would move the price of a security from  to 
? 
log  
What is the total cost of buying  shares of a 
security whose initial price is ? 
log ⁄ 1   
How many shares of a security must be 
bought/sold to move the price from  to ? log  
How many shares of security can be 
bought/sold for a total cost of ? log  1   
What will be the resulting price of a security 
after buying/selling  shares of that security 
with an initial price of ? 
1 ⁄ 1⁄  
What will be the result price of a security with 
an initial price of  after a transaction with a 
total cost of ? 
⁄  
 
We'll set prices scaled to c:  /∑ ⁄  
 
Running a market requires us to pick a value for b, which we can do using 
the method described above for a market with N possible outcomes (and thus 
N securities).  Given a total expected flow of capital into the market of K, and 
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a desired upper price target if all of this flows into one security of Pupper, we 
will use: 
  log 1 1  
 
 
VI. PRACTICAL NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
 
 
We present a market example, do all the math to six digits after the 
decimal point and use the natural logarithm.  Consider a market designed to 
estimate the probability of four possible outcomes for sales of product X in 
calendar year 2009: 
 
A.  Sales < 1,000,000 units 
B.  Sales ≥ 1,000,000 units but < 1,500,000 units 
C.  Sales ≥ 1,500,000 units but < 2,000,000 units 
D.  Sales ≥ 2,000,000 units 
 
We refer to each contingent security here using the letter assigned to it (A, 
B, C or D).  The four possibilities (N = 4) are mutually exclusive, and in 
practice should be anchored to a real-world event, which in this case might be 
the official sales result report released in January, 2010.  In this example, we 
scale our prices so that securities float between $0 and $100 (c = 100).  After 
the real-world event occurs, each share of the security representing the 
outcome that occurred is worth $100, and each share of the other securities is 
worth $0.  
Each trader will start with $10,000 in virtual dollars.  The only thing left 
to determine is the value of b to select for the market.  Make b too small, and 
the market prices will move too easily.  Make b too large, and traders will be 
frustrated by their inability to influence the market prices.  In this example, 
we are expecting 20 active traders from the pool of invitees.  We set b so that 
if all 20 traders invest everything in one outcome, the price of that security 
will rise to $99:  log 1 1
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 20 10000
100log 4 1 991004 1  
 463.232312 
 
We now open our market with all prices set to c/N, which in this case is 
100/4 = $25, so PA = $25.00, PB = $25.00, PC = $25.00 and PD = $25.00.  
Now our first trader asks to purchase $5000 worth of security B, so we need 
to calculate how many shares that is, where K represents the total change to 
the trader's cash balance (-$5000): 
 
log c e  1 1  
 
463.232312 log 100 e .  125.000000 1  
 174.004846 
 
To prevent rounding errors from causing cash-positive transactions that 
should not be ("cash pumps"), we round the number of shares awarded down 
as discussed above, in this case to 6 digits after the decimal point.  Since the 
amount of currency is exactly $5000, we do not need to round it up.  Note that 
there are many transactions supported by this model, including multiple 
simultaneous purchases, and that we are illustrating only a simple single-
security purchase and sale here.  We then calculate the new price for each 
security given the outstanding stock sold by the market maker so far (sA = 0, 
sB = 174.004846, sC = 0, sD = 0): 
  ∑ ⁄  
 
HANSON’S AUTOMATED MARKET MAKER 
 
58 
100 ..⁄ . .⁄ .⁄ .⁄  
 22.442099 
 
  ∑ ⁄  
 100 ...⁄ . .⁄ .⁄ .⁄  
 32.673702 
 
  ∑ ⁄  
 100 ..⁄ . .⁄ .⁄ .⁄  
 22.442099 
 
  ∑ ⁄  
 100 ..⁄ . .⁄ .⁄ .⁄  
 22.442099 
 
So the purchase transaction moved the market prices of A to $22.44, B to 
$32.67, C to $22.44 and D to $22.44.  Note that although we may display the 
prices rounded to the nearest penny, internally we always compute them from 
the stock vector, which is an exact representation of the number of shares 
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outstanding, and maintain higher precision for internal calculations.  In this 
way we avoid cumulative rounding errors, which can be a big problem over 
large numbers of transactions. 
Now suppose the same trader wishes to sell his stake of 174.004846 
shares of B.  Since the number of shares is exactly 174.004846, we do not 
need to round it up.  We compute the amount of money this stake is worth, 
rounding the amount of currency awarded down to prevent cash pumps as 
before: 
 
log 1 1  
 
463.232312 100 log 32.673702 .. 1100 1  
 4999.999916 
 
Note that our rounding to avoid cash pumps intentionally destroyed 
$0.000084 of currency for the trader with this purchase and subsequent sale.  
If instead we allowed minute fractional positive cash flow, then we would be 
subject to scripted attacks that generated cash.  Just like share prices, the 
logical thing to do is to display the rounded value of $5000.00 to the user, 
meaning that the loss of minute fractions of cash would only become visible 
to a trader after many such transactions.  We have not seen this in practice. 
Finally we compute the new prices of each security given the outstanding 
shares of each security (sA = 0, sB = 0, sC = 0, sD = 0) in the same way as 
above, which results in a return of the prices to PA = $25.00, PB = $25.00, PC 
= $25.00 and PD = $25.00. 
